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THE POWER OF A FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT TO
DIRECT ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW: REFLECTIONS ON WEISGRAM v. MARLEY CO.
Robert A. Ragazzo*
The civil jury plays an important role in our democratic
society. Commentators have often waxed eloquent on this
fundamental feature of the Anglo-American judicial system.
Blackstone described the right to a jury trial as "the glory of the
English law" and "the most transcendent privilege which any
subject can enjoy."' Justice Story wrote: "The Constitution
would have been justly obnoxious to the most conclusive
objection if it had not recognized and confirmed [the right to a
jury trial] in the most solemn terms." 2
In modem times, some have been more sanguine about the
right to a jury trial in civil cases. The civil jury has been
criticized on a number of grounds.3 The jury is often far from a
representative cross-section of the community. a The jury may
not be particularly good at finding facts,5 especially in complex
* George Butler Research Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. B.A.
1982, Fordham; J.D. 1985, Harvard.
1. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. 3, *379 (Garland
Publg. 1978).
2. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, vol. II, §
1779,558-59 (Little, Brown & Co. 1891).
3. For an article surveying the various criticisms of the civil jury and attempting an
empirical refutation of these criticisms, see Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American
Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 849 (1998).
4. See Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 Loy. L. Rev. 205, 210-11
(1985) (suggesting that "[w]e must stop deluding ourselves" because "[t]he juries actually
selected in most protracted cases are rarely true cross-sections").
5. See Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 180-81 (Brentano's 1930) (arguing
that jurors "are hopelessly incompetent as fact finders" and that "no one can be fatuous
enough to believe that the entire community can be so educated that a crowd of twelve men
chosen at random can do, even moderately well, what painstaking judges now find it
difficult to do").
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cases.6 Finally, the jury may be swayed by sympathy and is often
thought to display a pro-plaintiff bias.7
The twentieth century has seen the development of
mechanisms that allow the bench to exercise control over the
civil jury's function. The United States Supreme Court has
upheld against Seventh Amendment attack the power of trial
judges to remove cases from the jury's province and grant
judgment as a matter of law where one party's proof is
insufficient.8 In a trilogy of cases decided in 1986, the Supreme
Court molded the summary judgment procedure into a gate-
keeping mechanism that allows the trial judge to dismiss
meritless cases prior to the commencement of trial.9
6. See Franklin Strier, Reconstructing Justice: An Agenda for Trial Reform 111-12
(Quorum Books 1994) (arguing that "jurors lack adequate memories for recalling trial
testimony and have difficulties making decisions based on statistical or probabilistic
information" and that "an especially perplexing task for lay jurors is to assimilate and
select in some rational manner from the competing testimony of expert witnesses");
Burger, supra n. 4, at 211 (noting that in complex cases "[t]he analysis of documents, of
expert testimony, of charts, graphs and other visual aids, and the comprehension of such
evidence, present problems which often only a sophisticated business executive, an
economist, or another expert could grasp").
7. See e.g. Hiroshi Sarumida, Comparative Institutional Analysis of Product Safety
Systems in the United States and Japan: Alternative Approaches to Create Incentives for
Product Safety, 29 Cornell Intl. L.J. 79, 111 (1996) (citing a study by the RAND
corporation that "confirmed the pro-plaintiff attitude of juries when defendants were
corporations and plaintiffs suffered severe injuries"). But see Anthony Z. Roisman,
Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1945, 1954
(1994) (noting that "studies have found that juries are increasingly pro-business and anti-
plaintiff, thanks in part to the propaganda from tort reform advocates").
8. See Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372 (1943) (upholding the power to grant judgment
as a matter of law before the jury returns a verdict); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935) (upholding the power to grant judgment as a matter of law
after the jury returns a verdict). These cases are discussed in Part II.A.
9. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986). In Anderson, the Court held that "the appropriate summary judgment question will
be whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding" that the
plaintiff has proved his case by the relevant evidentiary standard. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255-56. Thus, the party with the burden of proof can no longer defeat a summary judgment
motion simply by introducing some evidence (the so-called scintilla rule), and the court
may consider the entire record in determining what a reasonable jury could find. See also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(l) (2000) (codifying the reasonable juror standard). Two
commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's "liberalized summary judgment
[standard] inhibits the filing of otherwise meritorious suits and results in a wealth transfer
from plaintiffs as a class to defendants as a class." Samuel Issacharoff & George
Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 75 (1990).
Reflections on Weisgram v. Marley Co.
The power of federal courts to address meritless cases
subsequent to the commencement or completion of trial is
authorized by Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for entry of judgment as a matter of law.' ° In
contrast to the Rule's explicit grant of this power to federal
district courts, the United States Supreme Court has considered
the scope of authority implicitly conferred by Rule 50 upon
federal appellate courts in two significant decisions. In Neely v.
Martin K. Eby Construction Co.,' the Court held that a federal
appellate court possesses the power to direct entry of judgment
as a matter of law for a verdict loser. More recently, in
Weisgram v. Marley Co.,2 the Court affirmed the power of
federal appellate courts to reverse and render judgment as a
matter of law on behalf of verdict losers where the verdict was
dependent on improperly admitted expert testimony.
This article considers the significance of the Weisgram
decision for federal appellate practice. Part I will review the
Neely decision, but will primarily focus on the facts and holding
of Weisgram. Part II will consider whether Neely and Weisgram
are correct in holding that federal appellate courts possess the
raw power to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law for
verdict losers, concluding that they have such power. Part III
will discuss the circumstances under which federal appellate
courts should exercise the power to direct entry of judgment as a
matter of law, concluding that Weisgram appears overly liberal
in delineating such circumstances.
I. BACKGROUND: JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
A. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co.
The Supreme Court first addressed the use of judgment as a
matter of law by appellate courts as a means to rid the courts of
unmeritorious cases in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction
10. Traditionally, this power was referred to as judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The rule now uses the term judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (West Group
2000). The author uses the term judgment as a matter of law throughout this article.
11. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
12. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
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Co. 3 In that case, the Court held that a federal appellate court
had the power to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law for
a verdict loser where the evidence in the record was insufficient
to support the jury's verdict as a matter of law. 4 The plaintiff in
Neely received a jury verdict in a negligence action. The
defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
the ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish
negligence. The trial court denied the defendant's motion and
entered judgment on the verdict. The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the trial court should have granted the defendant's
motion, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the
complaint.'5 The Supreme Court held that a federal appellate
court possesses the power to direct entry of judgment as a matter
of law for a verdict loser. 6 The Court held that exercise of this
power is consistent with: (a) the Seventh Amendment; (b) the
scope of appellate review contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2106; and (c)
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7
The Neely Court was mindful of the need to "protect the
rights of the party whose jury verdict has been set aside on
appeal and who may have valid grounds for a new trial." "s The
Court noted that the verdict winner, in addition to attempting to
preserve his verdict and judgment, could make a conditional
new trial motion in the court of appeals in the event his verdict
was set aside. 9 In some cases, where the appellate court believes
the district court erroneously denied the verdict loser's motion
for judgment as a matter of law, the appellate court should
remand to permit the district court to consider the verdict
winner's new trial motion due to the district court's superior
familiarity with the case.2° Because the verdict winner in Neely
raised no grounds for a new trial in the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the court of appeals properly directed
13. 368 U.S. 317 (1967).
14. Id. at 321,330.
15. See id. at 319-20.
16. See id. at 321,330.
17. See id. at 322-30.
18. Id. at 325.
19. The Court noted that the verdict winner could urge his new trial grounds in his brief
to the court of appeals or "in a petition for rehearing if the court of appeals has directed
entry of judgment for appellant." Id. at 329.
20. See id. at 325.
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entry of judgment as a matter of law for the verdict loser.2' Thus,
although Neely court rejected the argument that there is a "total
lack of power" in the court of appeals to direct entry of
judgment as a matter of law,22 it did not hold that the court of
appeals should always, or routinely, use this power.
B. Weisgram v. Marley Co.
In Weisgram v. Marley Co.,23 the Supreme Court returned
to this question. In Weisgram, the plaintiff brought a wrongful
death action against the manufacturer of a baseboard heater. The
plaintiff alleged that the heater was defective and malfunctioned,
causing a fire that resulted in his mother's death. The plaintiff's
proof on these issues was tendered to the jury through the
testimony of three expert witnesses. The jury's verdict was for
the plaintiff, and the defendant moved for judgment as a matter
of law before and after the jury's verdict. The trial judge denied
both motions and entered judgment on the verdict. The court of
appeals held that the testimony of the plaintiff's three experts
should not have been admitted and, without this evidence, that
the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case. The court of
appeals remanded with instructions to enter judgment as a
matter of law for the manufacturer. 4 The Supreme Court held
that the court of appeals properly directed entry of judgment as a
matter of law where the expert testimony was inadmissible and
therefore unavailable to support the jury's verdict.2 5 Without that
evidence, the verdict could not stand.
1. The Facts and Procedural History
On December 30, 1993, Bonnie Weisgram died in her
home as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning caused by a fire.
Chad Weisgram, the decedent's son, brought a wrongful death
action on behalf of himself and his mother's heirs against
21. The verdict winner attempted to raise new trial grounds for the first time in the
Supreme Court, and the Court refused to consider these grounds. See id. at 330.
22. Id.
23. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
24. See id. at 445.
25. See id. at 446, 457.
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Marley Company, the manufacturer of a baseboard heater used
in his mother's home.26 The plaintiff's theory of the case was
that the baseboard heater malfunctioned and caused a fire that
spread to a nearby sofa and spawned the fumes resulting in his
mother's death.27 The defendant argued that Bonnie Weisgram
inadvertently caused the fire by dropping a lighted cigarette
behind the sofa.28
The plaintiff called three expert witnesses to make his case
that the baseboard heater malfunctioned and caused the fire.
Initially, the plaintiff called Dan Freeman, a fire captain who
had performed an investigation for the local fire department.
Freeman opined that the burn and smoke patterns indicated that
the fire started in the entrance to Weisgram's home and radiated
to the sofa. He hypothesized a number of facts: The baseboard
heater malfunctioned and emitted excess heat; a throw rug
placed against the heater contained the heat and caused the heat
to build up; the heat raised the temperature on the vinyl floor,
which caused the release of gases; and these gases ignited and
caused the fire that engulfed the sofa and released the fumes that
killed Bonnie Weisgram.2 9
Second, the plaintiff called Ralph Dolence, an electrician
whose theory of the fire was the same as Freeman's. Although
he could not identify any design or manufacturing defect in the
heater, Dolence argued that the heater's thermostat and backup
high-limit control (which was designed to shut off the heater at
190 degrees) malfunctioned, causing the heater to emit excess
heat. In Dolence's view, this excess heat was trapped and
increased by the proximity of the throw rug, causing the vinyl
floor to heat up and release vapors that ignited and caused the
fire.
30
Third, the plaintiff called Sandy Lazarowicz, a metallurgist.
He testified that the heater's thermostat contacts were
defectively designed, which caused them to weld shut and
26. See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514 (8th Cir. 1999), affd, 528 U.S. 440
(2000). State Farm Fire and Casualty Company sued Marley to recover insurance benefits
paid to cover damage caused by the fire. See id. at 516.
27. See id. at 517.
28. See id. at 518 n. 4.
29. See id. at 518-19.
30. See id. at 519-20.
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rendered the thermostat cut-off mechanism ineffective.
Lazarowicz also theorized that the backup high-limit control
failed to shut off the heater because the mechanism was placed
in a location that prevented it from sensing the actual
temperature of the heater.'
The district court admitted the testimony of plaintiff's three
experts over the defendant's objection. The jury found for the
plaintiff and awarded $500,000 to the plaintiff and Bonnie
Weisgram's heirs.32 The court of appeals held by a 2-1 vote that
the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony
of plaintiff's experts under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence33 and the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.34
The Eighth Circuit's majority held that Freeman was
qualified to testify as an expert in fire investigation that the burn
and smoke patterns indicated a fire that began in the
entranceway and spread to the sofa, but that the rest of
Freeman's testimony was "blatant speculation., 35 The majority
emphasized that there was no record evidence on the location of
the throw rug prior to the start of the fire or the components or
physical properties of the vinyl flooring. The majority also
viewed Dolence's testimony as "rank speculation. 36 The
majority noted that Dolence had not done any testing to validate
his theory, relied principally on the observations made by
Freeman, and could not identify a design or manufacturing
defect in the heater. Similarly, the majority dismissed
Lazarowicz's opinions as nothing more than "'subjective belief
or unsupported speculation."' 37 The court noted that Lazarowicz
had not tested to determine whether it was possible for the
31. See id. at 520-21.
32. See id. at 516. The jury also awarded $100,575.42 to State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company. Id.
33. See id. at 521-22.
34. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Daubert criteria for the admission of expert scientific
testimony are discussed in Part III.B. The court of appeals in Weisgram assumed that the
Daubert criteria are generally relevant to all expert testimony, 169 F.3d at 517 n. 3, an
assumption later confirmed by the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999).
35. Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 518.
36. Id. at 520.
37. Id. at 521 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590).
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thermostat contacts to weld shut prior to the fire, and he was not
qualified to express an opinion regarding the failure of the
backup high-limit control.
In the majority's view, the plaintiff's case, stripped of this
expert testimony, was insufficient to survive the defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law. The majority stated,
We reject any contention that we are required to remand for
a new trial because our failure to do so would deny the
plaintiffs the opportunity to reopen discovery and identify
additional witnesses who might testify to their theory of
liability. Although [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d)]
certainly gives this Court the discretion to remand for a
new trial, we can discern no reason to give the plaintiffs a
second chance to make out a case of strict liability .... This
is not a close case. The plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to
prove their claim and they failed to do so."
As a consequence, the court of appeals vacated the
judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to
enter judgment as a matter of law for the defendant, Marley
Company.
2. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the courts of appeals regarding whether Rule 50 "permits
an appellate court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of
law when it determines that evidence was erroneously admitted
at trial and that the remaining, properly admitted evidence is
insufficient to constitute a submissible case., 40 A unanimous
38. Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 517 n. 2.
39. See id. at 522.
40. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 441 (2000). The Eighth Circuit in
Weisgram followed its previous decision in Wright v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d
1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1996) and agreed with two other circuits in holding that a federal
appellate court may direct entry of judgment as a matter of law after subtracting
erroneously admitted evidence. See Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., Ill F.3d 1174, 1178-
79 (4th Cir. 1997); Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299, 301, 306 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 817 (1997); see also Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816
F.2d 110, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1987) (dictum), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987). The Tenth
Circuit, by contrast, had held that an appellate court should not direct entry of judgment as
a matter of law in such circumstances because the verdict winner may have relied on the
trial court's evidentiary rulings. See Kinser v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259, 1267, 1269 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 985 (2000). A number of other appellate courts had held
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Court answered the question in the affirmative. The Court relied
on its prior decision in Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction
Co. 41 to establish that the court of appeals possessed the power to
direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.42 The Court rejected
any policy distinction between
cases in which judgment as a matter of law is requested
based on plaintiff's failure to produce enough evidence to
warrant a jury verdict, as in Neely, and cases in which the
proof introduced becomes insufficient because the court of
appeals determines that certain evidence should not have
43been admitted, as in the instant case.
There are two strands to the Court's reasoning. On one
hand, the Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that it was
unfair to allow an appellate court to direct entry of judgment as a
matter of law because, had the plaintiff known that its expert
witnesses could not testify, he would have had the opportunity
to present other experts or other proof in the district court. The
Court suggested that any reliance placed by the plaintiff on the
district court's admissibility rulings was inappropriate:
Since Daubert ... parties relying on expert evidence have
had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such
evidence must meet. It is implausible to suggest, post-
Daubert, that parties will initially present less than their
best expert evidence in the expectation of a second chance
should their first try fail .... [A]lthough Weisgram was on
that it was improper for the trial judge to grant judgment as a matter of law after deciding
to exclude evidence presented to the jury. See Schudel v. Gen. Elec. Co., 120 F.3d 991, 995
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998); Jackson v. Pleasant Grove Health
Care Center, 980 F.2d 692, 695-96 (1 Ith Cir. 1993); Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d
1339, 1343-44 (6th Cir. 1992); Persinger v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185,
1188-89 (4th Cir. 1990); Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Prod. Promotions, Inc., 717 F.2d 215,
218 (5th Cir. 1983); Townsend v. U.S. Rubber Co., 392 P.2d 404, 406 (N.M. 1964). But see
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1198-99 (3d Cir. 1993). Indeed, the
Eighth Circuit had previously concurred with this limitation on the district court's power.
See Midcontinent Broad. Co. v. N.C. Airlines, Inc., 471 F.2d 357, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1973).
Because an appellate court's entry of judgment as a matter of law raises more serious
concerns than a trial court's, as discussed in Part II.B, the courts expressing the view that
a trial judge is required to take the record as presented to the jury in ruling on a motion for
judgment as a matter of law may be viewed as agreeing with the Tenth Circuit's opinion in
Kinser.
41. 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
42. See Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 450.
43. Id. at 452.
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notice every step of the way that Marley was challenging
his experts, he made no attempt to add or substitute other
evidence."
Following this strand of reasoning, an appellate court that
views one party's proof as factually insufficient after deleting
improperly admitted evidence has no reason to hesitate in
directing entry of judgment as a matter of law after deleting
inadmissible evidence. There is a presumption that every party
presents its best case to the district court and, had the verdict
winner known that certain of his evidence would be
inadmissible, that he would have had no other evidence to
present.
On the other hand, the Court reiterated that a verdict winner
faced with a motion for judgment as a matter of law could, in
addition to opposing the motion, make a conditional motion for
a new trial.4 The Court reaffirmed its position in Neely that
"there are myriad situations in which the determination whether
a new trial is in order is best made by the trial judge." 4 6 The
Court did not, however, view the instant case to be in this
category. It noted that "Weisgram offered no specific grounds
for a new trial to the Eighth Circuit ' 47 and that, in the view of
the court of appeals, this was "not a close case." 48 Thus, as in
Neely, the Court's narrow holding was only that the court of
appeals has the power to direct entry of judgment as a matter of
law after excluding improperly admitted evidence. Its suggestion
that this power can be liberally exercised is nevertheless
troubling.
Weisgram involves a significant extension of Neely because
the plaintiff's proof was concededly sufficient based on the
record evidence. The problem was not that the jury reached an
unreasonable conclusion based on the record; rather, the
problem was that the record was tainted by the trial judge's
improper admission of certain evidence. The verdict winner in
44. Id. at 455 (internal citations omitted).
45. The Court noted, as it had in Neely, that a verdict winner could present his new trial
grounds in his brief to the court of appeals or a petition for rehearing. See Weisgram, 528
U.S. at 455 n. 11; see also supra n. 19 and accompanying text.
46. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 456.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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Weisgram may well have relied on the trial judge's admissibility
rulings in deciding what other evidence to present. Had the
verdict winner known that the testimony of his three proffered
experts would not be admissible, he might have tendered other
experts or searched for other proof that the baseboard heater was
defective and caused the fire. Although Weisgram, like Neely,
permits the court of appeals to remand to the trial court the
question whether the verdict winner should be granted a new
trial,49 it raises troubling questions regarding the appellate
court's power finally to resolve a case by directing entry of
judgment as a matter of law.
II. THE POWER OF A FEDERAL APPELLATE COURT TO DIRECT
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Supreme Court in Neely and Weisgram held that a
federal appellate court's power to direct entry of judgment as a
matter of law is consistent with three legal provisions: (a) the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; (b) 28
U.S.C. § 2106; and (c) Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This Part examines each justification in turn.
A. The Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment states: "In Suits at common
law.... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law."50 Because the Seventh Amendment preserves rather than
creates the common law right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court
has long held that the amendment mandates an historical
inquiry. Despite the fact that the United States had been an
independent country for fifteen years in 1791 (the date of the
Seventh Amendment's adoption), the Court has also long held
that the historical reference is to the jury trial practice of the
English common law courts in 1791 rather than the courts of the
49. See id. at 451, 457.
50. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
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several states." However, the Supreme Court has vacillated on
just how much history the Seventh Amendment imports.
In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,' the Supreme
Court considered the constitutional power of trial and appellate
courts to enter judgment as a matter of law. In that case, the
defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of
the evidence on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to
support a verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury
returned a plaintiff's verdict. The defendant moved for judgment
as a matter of law after the jury's verdict. The trial court again
denied the motion and entered judgment on the verdict. The
appellate court found the evidence insufficient and reversed with
instructions to enter judgment for the defendant. 3 The Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the Seventh Amendment's
reexamination clause precluded the entry of judgment for the
defendant after the jury returned a verdict. 4
The majority took a strict historical view of the Seventh
Amendment. The majority argued that, once the jury returned a
verdict, the most an English court in 1791 could do if it believed
the evidence insufficient was order a new trial.5 The only way
an English court could have removed a case from the jury and
entered judgment based on insufficient evidence was by a
demurrer to the evidence, which involved a very different
procedure from the modem motion for judgment as a matter of
law. 6 The demurrer to the evidence was made prior to the jury's
51. See e.g. Dimick v. Shiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899); see also U.S. v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (Mass. Cir. 1812)
(Story, J.) (noting that "[b]eyond all question, the common law here alluded to is not the
common law of any individual state,. . . but it is the common law of England, the grand
reservoir of all our jurisprudence"). Interestingly, since 1933 there has been no general
right to a jury trial in English civil cases. See Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases:
English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 43, 106 n. 286
(1980).
52. 228 U.S. 364 (1913).
53. See id. at 369.
54. See id. at 399.
55. See id. at 380 (arguing that a verdict unsupported by the evidence "could be
corrected on writ of error only by ordering a new trial").
56. There were two procedures that permitted an English court to enter judgment for a
verdict loser. First, a defendant could move for judgment non obstante veredicto (i.e.,
notwithstanding the verdict) on the ground that the plaintiff's pleading allegations failed to
state a claim. Second, the plaintiff could move to arrest judgment on the verdict where the
defendant confessed the truth of the complaint's allegations and set up a matter in
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verdict, not after. It required the movant to accept all the
opposing party's evidence. If the demurrer was sustained, the
trial court entered judgment for the movant. If the demurrer was
overruled, the trial court entered judgment for the party
opposing the movant. The trial court's determination could be
reviewed on appeal, and the English appellate court had the
opportunity to enter judgment for either party. Because the
demurrer created a dispositive question of law for the court, the
jury was discharged once the demurrer was made.57 Thus, by its
very nature, the demurrer to the evidence precluded entry of
judgment by any court after the jury returned a verdict.
The four dissenters in Slocum believed that the majority
had engaged in unnecessary formalism. The dissenters argued
that, as long as there was some method by which an English
court in 1791 could take the case away from the jury and enter
judgment as a matter of law based on insufficient evidence, the
precise particulars of the English procedure were irrelevant. 8
Having the jury return a verdict simply adds to the court's
convenience. Because the modern motion for judgment as a
matter of law does not require the movant to accept the other
party's evidence, if a trial judge grants judgment as a matter of
law prior to a jury verdict and the appellate court reverses, the
case must be remanded for a new trial. However, if the jury
returns a verdict and then judgment as a matter of law is granted
to the verdict loser and the appellate court reverses, judgment
based on the verdict can simply be reinstated.
59
avoidance that was legally insufficient to constitute a defense. As the Slocum Court noted,
each of these procedures is addressed to the legal sufficiency of the pleadings rather than to
the sufficiency of the proof upon which the jury's verdict is based. See id. at 381.
57. See id. at 388-92. At common law, the plaintiff had the right to take a nonsuit and
have his complaint dismissed without prejudice where his proof was insufficient. However,
as the Slocum Court noted, this procedure bears little resemblance to the modem motion for
judgment as a matter of law because the nonsuit was voluntary in nature, did not result in
the entry of judgment for the defendant, and did not bar the plaintiff from bringing another
case based on the same claim. See id. at 392-94.
58. See id. at 408 (arguing that "[tihe Seventh Amendment, it cannot be doubted, deals
with matters of substance and not with mere matters of form"); see id. at 423 (concluding
that "the point is not that the ordinary practice on a motion for the direction of a verdict is
identical with that on a demurrer to the evidence, but that the latter as well as the former
was clearly permitted by the Constitution") (Hughes, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 419 (suggesting that a court should be "authorized to take provisionally
the verdict of the jury to avoid the delay and expense of a new trial in case it should appear
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In Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,60 the
Supreme Court overruled Slocum in everything but name and
adopted the position urged by the Slocum dissenters. In Redman,
the defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law prior to the
verdict. The trial court reserved its ruling and submitted the case
to the jury. After the jury returned a plaintiff's verdict, the trial
judge denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law and
entered judgment on the verdict. The court of appeals held that
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and reversed
with instructions to grant a new trial on authority of Slocum.61
A unanimous Supreme Court held that the court of appeals
should have directed entry of judgment for the defendant.6 The
Court distinguished Slocum on the ground that the trial court
reserved decision on the motion for judgment as a matter of law
prior to the jury's verdict.63 In Slocum, this first motion had
simply been denied by the trial court. The Court referenced an
English practice whereby a trial judge could take a jury's verdict
subject to reserved questions of law and, based on the
determination of the reserved questions, enter judgment for the
verdict loser.64 The Court seemed unconcerned that its historical
analogue involved questions of law other than demurrers to the
evidence. As already noted, the demurrer to the evidence
resulted in the discharge of the jury.65
on a careful consideration of the evidence that it involved a dispute of fact which the jury
should have resolved").
60. 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
61. See id. at 656.
62. See id. at 66 1.
63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) codifies this result by providing:
If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law made at the close of all the evidence, the court is considered to have
submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal
questions raised by the motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (West Group 2000). Thus, even if the court denies a motion for
judgment as a matter of law made at the close of the evidence, the motion is deemed to be
reserved. Rule 50(b) solves any lingering Seventh Amendment problems flowing from
Slocum unless a party neglects to make a motion for judgment as a matter of law prior to
the jury retiring.
64. See Redman, 295 U.S. at 659.
65. See supra text accompanying n. 57. The approach of Redman was applied in
Galloway v. U.S., 319 U.S. 372 (1943). In Galloway, the Supreme Court upheld against
Seventh Amendment attack a trial court's entry of judgment as a matter of law prior to any
jury determination. The Court relied primarily on the historical analogue of a demurrer to
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It was an appellate court in Redman rather than the trial
court that directed entry of judgment as a matter of law. Thus,
the Neely Court, relying on Redman, saw "no greater restriction
on the province of the jury when an appellate court enters
judgment [as a matter of law] than when a trial court does" and
held that the Seventh Amendment constitutes no bar to appellate
direction of entry of judgment as a matter of law.66 Weisgram
simply relied on Neely for the same proposition.
The Supreme Court's decision in Gasperini v. Center for
Humanities, Inc.6 -which intervened between Neely and
Weisgram and was not cited in Weisgram-casts some doubt on
the view that it is irrelevant for Seventh Amendment purposes
which level of court enters judgment as a matter of law.
Gasperini involved a diversity case decided under New York
substantive law. The case focused on a New York tort reform
measure that permits a trial judge, or the New York Appellate
Division, to review the size of a jury's verdict and order a new
trial whenever the verdict deviates materially from the
evidence.6 ' Gasperini held that a federal district court in
examining the jury verdict for excessiveness must apply the
New York "deviates materially" standard ° rather than a federal
standard that makes it more difficult to displace the jury's
the evidence. The Court rejected the three dissenters' argument that there were two
significant procedural differences between modem and common law practice. See id. at
402-05 (Black, J., dissenting). First, at common law, a demurrer to the evidence could be
sustained only if the party opposing the motion presented absolutely no evidence in support
of some aspect of his case (the so-called "scintilla rule"). In Galloway, judgment as a
matter of law was granted because the verdict was not supported by "substantial"
evidence. See id. at 395. Currently, the motion is granted if the jury's verdict is
unreasonable in light of all the evidence. See supra n. 8 (discussing the granting of
judgment as a matter of law before the jury returns a verdict). Second, a party making a
demurrer to the evidence took a greater risk than a party making a motion for judgment as a
matter of law because the demurrer required the movant to admit the opposing party's
evidence and risk entry of judgment for the opposing party. If a modem motion for
judgment as a matter of law is denied, the case proceeds to the jury. Thus, Redman and
Galloway make it easier for the judge to displace the jury than the common law procedure.
As a consequence, whether this is viewed a positive or negative development, there has
clearly been some diminution of the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial.
66. Neely, 386 U.S. at 322.
67. See Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 449.
68. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
69. See id. at 422-25.
70. See id. at 426-3 1.
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verdict, the so-called "shock the conscience" standard.7 The
Court saw no Seventh Amendment problems with this result
because English trial judges in 1791 could grant new trials based
on the excessiveness of verdicts.72
The Court had more difficulty with the New York
provision that allows an appellate court to reverse a trial judge's
denial of a new trial motion if the appellate court finds that the
amount of the verdict deviates materially from the evidence.73
Gasperini held that federal rather than state law governs the
standard of appellate review and that federal law permits review
of a district judge's denial of a new trial motion only for abuse
of discretion.74 The Court found this federal standard of review
consistent with the Seventh Amendment.75 The Gasperini Court
viewed its Solomonic decision as balancing the interests of the
New York tort-reform scheme and federal jury trial interests.
76
Thus, Gasperini suggests that a federal district court may have
more j ower to displace a jury's verdict than a federal appellate
court.
Does Gasperini imply that the Weisgram Court erred in
holding that a federal appellate court's power to direct entry of
judgment as a matter of law was coordinate with a district
court's? Although the Weisgram Court's failure to discuss
Gasperini is troubling, it would be wrong to take this view of
Gasperini. Gasperini does more to confirm than deny the looser
historical approach to the Seventh Amendment represented by
Redman and, indirectly, by Neely and Weisgram. Although
English trial courts had the power to grant new trials based on
the excessiveness of verdicts, English appellate courts had no
such power. They could only review trial court judgments for
71. The New York standard was enacted to give the courts greater control over jury
awards. See id. at 422-24.
72. See id. at 433.
73. Id. at 434 (noting that "appellate review of a federal trial court's denial of a motion
to set aside a jury's verdict as excessive is a relatively late, and less secure, development").
74. See 0. at 437-38.
75. See id. at 434-36.
76. See i0. at 436-38.
77. Indeed, one Justice dissented to "reject the suggestion that the Seventh Amendment
limits the power of a federal appellate court sitting in diversity to decide whether a jury's
award of damages exceeds a limit established by state law." Id. at 439 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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errors of law and could not inquire into the factual sufficiency of
verdicts. Three dissenters in Gasperini argued, therefore, that
the Seventh Amendment precludes any appellate review of a
district judge's denial of a new trial motion." The majority did
not take issue with the accuracy of the dissenters' historical
rendition. Rather, it argued that "appellate review for abuse of
discretion is reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment as a
control necessary and proper to the fair administration of
justice." 79 Thus, the majority justified appellate review on policy
rather than historical grounds. If the looser historical approach to
the Seventh Amendment is correct, it would not seem to matter
which level of court displaces a jury's verdict as long as some
English judge had an analogous power in 1791.
Moreover, although the Gasperini majority did not permit
appellate courts the same latitude as district courts in reviewing
jury verdicts for excessiveness, Gasperini did not squarely hold
that the Seventh Amendment requires this result. It held only
that abuse of discretion review is consistent with the Seventh
Amendment. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc.,80 upon which the Gasperini Court relied," the Supreme
Court held that federal law (which relegated a particular fact
question to the jury) prevailed over state law (which relegated
the question to the judge) in a diversity case based on the strong
federal policy in favor of jury trials flowing from the Seventh
Amendment. Byrd reached this result without considering
whether the Seventh Amendment mandated a jury trial on the
instant facts."- Similarly, Gasperini's choice of the federal abuse
of discretion standard in a diversity case does not necessarily
indicate that broader appellate review would violate the Seventh
Amendment. Gasperini is best viewed as a Byrd-inspired
decision that does not preclude an appellate court from
exercising the same power to review a jury's findings for
sufficiency of the evidence as a trial court.83
78. See id. at 450-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 435.
80. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
81. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 431-33, 436-38.
82. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537 n. 10.
83. Moreover, Weisgram presents a stronger case than Gasperini for permitting
appellate courts to exercise the same power as trial courts in reviewing jury verdicts
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B. 28 U.S.C. § 2106
In granting appellate jurisdiction to the federal appellate
courts, Congress has provided:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate
jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse
any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought
before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct
the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or
require such further proceedings to be had as may be just
under the circumstances. 4
Because the statute permits any federal appellate court to
vacate any appealed judgment and "direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment ... as may be just under the
circumstances," Neely held85 and Weisgram reaffirmed 6 that a
federal appellate court has the power to direct entry of judgment
for a verdict loser.
To some extent this holding is circular. It depends on the
other conclusions argued in Part II of this article: An appellate
court's direction to enter judgment is consistent with the
Seventh Amendment and Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. If an appellate court's direction of entry of judgment
violated either provision it could not possibly be classified as
"appropriate." Moreover, it would seem that the considerations
of Part III.A of this article are also relevant because, if policy
were to dictate that fundamental unfairness would result from an
appellate court's direction to enter judgment, such direction
would not be appropriate.87 Thus, the construction of 28 U.S.C. §
2106 by Neely and Weisgram suggests only that as long as no
other legal provisions are violated, and sound policy is
furthered, a federal appellate court has the power to direct entry
because, although English appellate courts had no power to reverse the denial of new trial
motions, they possessed de novo review with respect to decisions granting or denying
demurrers to the evidence. See supra text accompanying n. 57.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1994).
85. Neely, 386 U.S. at 322,
86. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 449.
87. See Neely, 386 U.S. at 338-39 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that appellate
direction of judgment is not appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 because Rule 50 and
sound policy do not permit it).
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of judgment as a matter of law. Although this conclusion is
obviously correct, it proves very little.
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8 governs
motions for judgment as a matter of law and conditional new
trial motions appended thereto. Although Neely and Weisgram
are principally concerned with Rule 50(d), it is worth
considering Rule 50 as an integrated whole.
Any party seeking judgment as a matter of law must so
move prior to submission of the case to the jury. 9 If the trial
court denies the motion, it is deemed to reserve decision and
take the jury's verdict subject to the motion.9 ° This procedure
gives the verdict loser the opportunity to renew its motion for
judgment as a matter of law after the jury returns a verdict.9 If
the verdict loser fails to renew his motion for judgment as a
matter of law, the most the trial or appellate court can do is order
a new trial. A verdict loser may join its renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law with a conditional motion for a new
trial.92 If the trial court grants judgment as a matter of law to the
verdict loser, it is also required to rule on the conditional motion
for a new trial.93 If the appellate court reverses the grant of
judgment as a matter of law, it then has the opportunity to
review the trial court's decision on the conditional new trial
motion.
Rule 50(c)(2) and Rule 50(d) deal with the verdict winner's
new trial rights. If the trial court grants the verdict loser's
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the verdict
88. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (West Group 2000).
89. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). Consistent with the Seventh Amendment, the district
court may grant the motion of judgment as a matter of law without submitting the case to
the jury or reconsider the motion after the jury's verdict. However, the district court may
not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law that is made for the first time after the
jury's verdict. See supra n. 63 & text accompanying nn. 48-63.
90. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). This reservation permits the district court to grant
judgment as a matter of law subsequent to the jury verdict without violating the Seventh
Amendment. See supra text accompanying nn. 57-63.
91. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
92. See id.
93. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940); Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(c)(1).
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winner has ten days to move for a new trial in the district court.94
If the trial court denies the verdict loser's renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law and the verdict loser appeals, the
verdict winner may urge as appellee any grounds entitling him
to a new trial in the event the appellate court holds that the trial
court erred in denying the verdict loser's renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law.9 If the court of appeals holds that
the trial court erred in denying the verdict loser's renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court of appeals may
resolve the new trial motion or remand to the district court for a
determination of whether a new trial should be held.96
Thus, Rule 50 contemplates that the verdict loser will make
all challenges to the verdict in district court, including any
motions for a new trial. It contemplates that the district court
will make the initial determination of whether a new trial should
be granted. The verdict winner, by contrast, is entitled to an
opportunity to make a conditional new trial motion in the district
court but is not always required to make such a motion. Rule 50
contemplates that the verdict winner may make his conditional
new trial motion for the first time in the court of appeals.
It is worth examining each half of the verdict winner's
situation relative to any conditional new trial motion. First, the
verdict winner is entitled to the opportunity to make a
conditional new trial motion in the district court. It is for this
reason that the Supreme Court held, in Cone v. West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co.,i' that a verdict loser may not receive
judgment as a matter of law unless he renews such motion after
the jury returns a verdict.98 This renewed motion gives the
verdict winner the opportunity to present any new trial grounds
to the district court. Cone squarely rejected the contention that a
verdict winner's rights are adequately protected by the
94. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(2).
95. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(d).
96. See id.
97. 330 U.S. 212 (1947).
98. The holding in Cone has continually been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See
Johnson v. N.Y., N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48 (1952); Weade v. Dichinann,
Wright & Pugh, Inc., 337 U.S. 801 (1949); Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Globe
Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948).
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opportunity to make new trial arguments in the court of
appeals.99
Second, the verdict winner is not required to present
potential grounds for a new trial until and unless some court
determines that judgment should be entered for the verdict loser.
The verdict winner may oppose the verdict loser's renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law and make a conditional
new trial motion in the district court. However, the verdict
winner may also wait until ten days after the district court grants
the verdict loser's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law before moving for a new trial.'°° If the trial court denies the
verdict loser's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law,
the verdict winner has similar latitude in the court of appeals.
The verdict winner may urge conditional new trial grounds in
the court of appeals as part of the original argument of the case
or may present such grounds to the court for the first time in a
petition for rehearing in the event the court of appeals holds that
the district court erroneously denied judgment as a matter of law
to the verdict loser.'c
One may well ask why the verdict winner is not treated the
same as the verdict loser with respect to conditional new trial
motions? Why is the verdict winner not required to urge any
new trial grounds on the district court in the first instance so that
the appellate court is presented with a complete record for
review? The asymmetry in Rule 50 is explained by the
awkwardness of urging new trial grounds at the same time one is
trying to defend a verdict and judgment.' 2 Urging grounds for a
new trial may seemingly undermine the verdict and judgment
one is trying to defend. Moreover, new trial grounds may be
taken less seriously by the district court when the court is in the
99. See Cone, 330 U.S. at 216 (arguing that "[d]etermination of whether a new trial
should be granted or a judgment entered under Rule 50 (b) calls for the judgment in the
first instance of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the case
which no appellate printed transcript can impart" ).
100. See Neely, 386 U.S. at 325 (noting that "[w]here a defendant moves for [judgment
as a matter of law] in the trial court, the plaintiff may present, in connection with that
motion or with a separate motion after [judgment as a matter of law] is granted, his grounds
for a new trial"); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(2).
101. See Weisgran, 528 U.S. at 455; Neely, 386 U.S. at 328-29.
102. See Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455 n. I I (recognizing that "it is awkward for an
appellee, who is wholeheartedly urging the correctness of the verdict, to point out, in the
alternative, grounds for a new trial").
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process of entering judgment for the party making the
conditional new trial motion.
As a consequence, the verdict winner is privileged, but is
not always required, to present a new trial motion to the district
court in the first instance. However, the verdict winner must live
with the consequences of this choice. If the verdict winner
chooses to save his new trial motion for the court of appeals, he
should not be surprised that the court of appeals, in appropriate
cases, has the power to deny the motion without a remand to the
district court. Although Rule 50(d) stipulates that the court of
appeals may remand the case to the district court for an initial
determination of the verdict winner's conditional new trial
motion, the rule is phrased in permissive terms.' °3 This language
implies that the court of appeals is not required to remand and
may deny the new trial motion on its own and direct entry of
judgment as a matter of law for the verdict loser. Where the
verdict winner seeks to guarantee that the district court will rule
on his conditional new trial motion in the first instance, he
should make the motion in district court.
D. Conclusion
There is no affirmative reason that precludes a federal
appellate court from directing entry of judgment as a matter of
law. The Seventh Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 2106, and Rule 50
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure all permit such action.
As Part III.A argues, there are sound policy justifications for
allowing appellate courts in some cases finally to resolve cases
without remanding for a trial court's consideration of a verdict
winner's new trial motion. As a consequence, Neely and
103. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(d) provides:
If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it
from determining that the appellee is entitled to a new trial, or from directing the
trial court to determine whether a new trial shall be granted.
Id. The dissenter in Neely argued that Rule 50(d) permits the appellate court to grant the
verdict winner's new trial motion or remand to the district court but does not permit the
appellate court to deny such motion. See Neely, 386 U.S. at 341 (Black, J., dissenting).
However, it seems wrong to assume that Rule 50(d) creates any power for the courts of
appeals or denies any power not expressly given by the rule. The rule merely emphasizes
that an appellate court may exercise power to grant the new trial motion or remand that
presumably flows from a source other than the rule (" nothing in this rule precludes").
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Weisgram are correct to hold that federal appellate courts have
the raw power to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law.
However, as Part III.B demonstrates, this result hardly means
that appellate courts should generally or routinely deprive the
trial court of the power to consider a verdict winner's new trial
motion.
III. EXERCISING THE APPELLATE POWER TO DIRECT ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
In Neely, the Supreme Court held that a federal appellate
court has the power to direct entry of judgment as a matter of
law for a verdict loser on the ground that the case submitted to
the jury by the verdict winner was factually insufficient. In
Weisgram, the Court extended Neely and held that a federal
appellate court may make a similar direction after subtracting
evidence on behalf of the verdict winner that was improperly
admitted at trial. This Part will examine appropriate and
inappropriate uses by federal appellate courts of the power
granted by Neely and Weisgram.
A. Situations in Which a Federal Appellate Court Should Direct
Entry of Judgment as a Matter of Law
Federal appellate courts should possess the power to direct
entry of judgment as a matter of law for verdict losers because,
in some situations, exercise of this power conserves judicial
resources. There are three such situations: (a) where the verdict
winner's grounds for a new trial rest upon legal questions the
resolution of which makes it clear that no new trial is warranted;
(b) where the verdict winner's grounds for a new trial presented
to the district court could not be sustained as an exercise of
discretion; and (c) where the verdict winner presents no grounds
for a new trial and no reason why he should be permitted to
present such grounds to the district court in the first instance.
The Neely Court had the first of these situations squarely in
mind:
[W]here the court of appeals sets aside the jury's verdict
because the evidence was insufficient to send the case to
the jury, it is not so clear that the litigation should be
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terminated.... The erroneous exclusion of evidence which
would have strengthened [the verdict winner's] case is an
important possibility. Another is that the trial court itself
caused the insufficiency in [the verdict winner's] case by
erroneously placing too high a burden of proof on him at
trial. But issues like these are issues of law with which the
courts of appeals regularly and characteristically must deal.
The district court in all likelihood has already ruled on
these questions in the course of the trial and, in any event,
has no special advantage or competence in dealing with
them."°
To take Neely's example, suppose that the court of appeals
holds that the district court improperly denied the verdict loser's
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the verdict winner
argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in
excluding certain of his evidence (e.g., under the hearsay rule),
or that the district court erroneously allocated the burden of
proof on a particular issue. In such cases, a remand to the district
court for a new trial determination is often unnecessary. The
district court has already made whatever legal rulings the verdict
winner is challenging, and the court of appeals is presented with
a full record for review. If the court of appeals holds that the
district court committed no legal error in excluding evidence or
allocating the burden of proof, there is no reason the court of
appeals should not finally resolve the litigation by directing
entry of judgment as a matter of law for the verdict loser.
However, if the court of appeals holds that the district court
erred in excluding evidence or allocating the burden of proof,
the appropriate resolution is not so clear. It may still be
appropriate for the court of appeals to direct entry of judgment
as a matter of law for the verdict loser. Perhaps the verdict
loser's case is so strong that no reasonable juror could find for
the verdict winner even if the verdict winner presented his
additional evidence and the burden of proof were correctly
allocated. In other circumstances, it might constitute an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to grant the verdict winner's new
trial motion. '0 5 In these cases, a remand to the district court
104. Neely, 386 U.S. at 327.
105. The decision to grant or deny a new trial motion is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court and reviewable on appeal only for abuse of discretion. See
e.g. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 422-23, 437-39.
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serves no purpose and unnecessarily wastes judicial resources
because there is only one decision that will withstand appellate
review.'06
Lastly, the court of appeals should direct entry of judgment
as a matter of law whenever the verdict winner presents no
grounds for a new trial and no reason why he should be
permitted to present such grounds to the district court in the first
instance." 7 This situation occurred in Neely itself.0 8 Under such
circumstances, a remand is a meaningless formality.
B. Situations in Which a Federal Appellate Court Should Not
Direct Entry of Judgment as a Matter of Law
There are, by contrast, three situations in which federal
appellate courts should not exercise the NeelylWeisgram power
to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law: (a) where it is
unfair to require the verdict winner to present his new trial
grounds to the court of appeals; (b) where the new trial grounds
involve an exercise of the district court's discretion that would
be entitled to respect on appeal; and (c) where the district court
is in a superior position to determine whether a new trial should
be granted. The Weisgram case may be used to illustrate each
situation.
The plaintiff in Weisgram conducted the trial with the
understanding that the testimony of its experts would be
admissible. Had the district court ruled that the plaintiff's
experts would not be allowed to testify, the plaintiff would have
had the opportunity to submit other experts or otherwise address
106. As argued in Part III.B, the appellate court should not direct entry of judgment as a
matter of law for the verdict loser if a district court's decision to grant the verdict winner a
new trial would be affirmed on appeal.
107. Circumstances in which the verdict loser should be permitted to present new trial
grounds to the district court in the first instance are discussed in Part III.B.
108. As the Court noted:
In the Court of Appeals the issue was the sufficiency of the evidence and that
court set aside the verdict. Petitioner, as appellee, suggested no grounds for a
new trial in the event her judgment was reversed, nor did she petition for
rehearing in the Court of Appeals, even though that court had directed a
dismissal of her case.
Neely, 386 U.S. at 329. Although the verdict winner attempted to assert grounds for a new
trial for the first time in the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court declined to consider
arguments not presented to the court of appeals. See id. at 330.
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the gaps in his case. It is for this reason that some pre-Weisgram
cases held that the trial court, much less the court of appeals,
lacks the power to enter judgment as a matter of law for the
verdict loser after deleting certain of the verdict winner's
evidence:
Although the trial court found insufficient evidence to
sustain the verdict, it did so only after excluding plaintiff's
expert testimony which had been presented to the jury. This
was error. In ruling on the sufficiency of evidence the trial
court must take the record as presented to the jury and
cannot enter judgment on a record altered by the
elimination of incompetent evidence.... If plaintiff had
been forewarned during the trial that such testimony was
not admissible it conceivably could have sugplied further
foundation or even totally different evidence.'
After the Eighth Circuit's decision in Weisgram, the gaps in
the plaintiff's case were clear. The plaintiff needed: (a) an expert
on baseboard heaters rather than electrical, fire, and
metallurgical experts; (b) proof regarding the position of the
throw rug that might have contributed to the transfer of the fire
from the heater to the sofa; and/or (c) proof regarding the
potential for the flooring materials to heat up and give off vapors
that might ignite." ° Thus, the first time the plaintiff could have
offered new evidence and moved for a new trial with awareness
of the defects in his case would have been in a petition for
rehearing in the court of appeals."' As Weisgram confirms, the
plaintiff was entitled to present his new trial grounds in such a
petition. ,,2
However, it was unfair to force the plaintiff to present his
new trial grounds to the court of appeals in a petition for a
rehearing rather than to the district court. The plaintiff had only
fourteen days to petition the court of appeals for rehearing."3 It
109. Midcontinent Broad. Co. v. N.C. Airlines, Inc., 471 F.2d 357, 358-59 (8th Cir.
1973); see also supra n. 40 (collecting cases).
110. See supra text accompanying nn. 33-35.
11I. See Martin B. Louis, Post-Verdict Rulings on the Sufficiency of the Evidence:
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co. Revisited, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 503, 519 n. 90
(observing that "it is often difficult to argue that a gap in one's proof can be filled before a
court has held that the gap exists").
112. See Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455 & n. 11.
113. See Fed. R. App. P. 40 (West Group 2000).
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is unfair to expect the plaintiff to put together a new case in
fourteen days.' 14 Had the case been remanded, the district court
might have allowed the plaintiff a reasonable time to proffer
new evidence."' Moreover, petitions for rehearing are routinely
denied by the courts of appeals."' Forcing a verdict winner to
move for a new trial at this stage makes it extraordinarily
unlikely that many new trials will be granted.
The Weisgram Court argued that it is fair to allow the court
of appeals to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law after
excluding certain evidence relied on by the verdict winner
because parties should generally be expected to put forward
their best cases in district court. The Court also emphasized that
the verdict winner was on notice that his experts were subject to
Daubert challenge and should have been Prepared for the
possibility that his experts would be excluded.'
Neither of these arguments is persuasive. The verdict
winner surely did not withhold evidence in district court. He
presented three experts-not one. Until the court of appeals
acted, he had no way of knowing that he needed a heater expert
and other physical proof. Until that time, he had every right to
believe that he presented evidence from which a reasonable jury
114. The Weisgram Court argued that the fourteen-day period allowed for rehearing
petitions was longer than the ten-day period allowed for new trial motions in the district
court by a verdict winner after the district court grants the verdict loser's motion for
judgment as a matter of law. See Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455 n. 11; Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(2).
However, where the district court believes that the plaintiff is entitled to more time to
prepare his case, the district court always has the power to allow the plaintiff to take a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice. See Neely, 386 U.S. at 328 (noting that "[a] plaintiff
whose jury verdict is set aside by the trial court on defendant's motion for judgment [as a
matter of law] may ask the trial judge to grant a voluntary nonsuit to give plaintiff another
chance to fill a gap in his proof"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (permitting the district court to
determine the circumstances pursuant to which a plaintiff will be permitted voluntarily to
dismiss his action without prejudice).
115. There are no time limits in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ability to
petition the district court for a new trial after an appellate reversal. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(c)(2) (allowing a verdict winner ten days after the district court grants the verdict loser
judgment as a matter of law to petition for a new trial); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) (allowing a
judgment loser ten days to petition the district court for a new trial).
116. For example, the Fifth Circuit clerk's office reports that, for the year ending
September 30, 2000, only fourteen petitions for panel rehearing were granted out of a total
of 523 (i.e., 2.7%). Clerk's Office,United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Statistical Snapshot, <http:www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/APPENDIXIREV.htm> (accessed
May 23, 2001).
117. See supra n. 44 and accompanying text.
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could conclude that a defect in the heater caused the fire that
killed Bonnie Weisgram.
Moreover, the verdict winner could not have known that his
experts would be excluded by a Daubert analysis. In Daubert,
the Supreme Court set forth four factors that guide consideration
of whether an expert's theory is sufficiently reliable to assist the
trier of fact: (a) the extent to which the theory has been and can
be tested;" 8 (b) the extent to which the theory has been subjected
to publication and peer review; ' (c) the theory's known or
potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of
standards that control the theory's operation;'2 ° and (d) the extent
to which the theory is generally accepted by other experts in the
same field. 2'
This four-factor test is hardly straightforward and easy to
apply."' Four judges passed on the Daubert question in
Weisgram. 3 Two judges (the district judge and the dissenter in
the court of appeals) found that the verdict winner's experts
passed Daubert scrutiny.'24 Two judges (the court of appeals's
majority) found the experts' testimony inadmissible under
Daubert.25 Thus, the Daubert result is hardly something the
verdict winner could have forecast.
Nor is it fair to suggest that the verdict winner should have
understood in advance the grounds on which his experts would
be excluded or what other experts might be allowed to testify.
Under these circumstances, the verdict winner should not have
been expected to produce new experts, which may entail
substantial expense, or other evidence within fourteen days after
the court of appeals's decision.
118. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
119. See id. at 593-94.
120. See id. at 594.
121. See id.
122. On the difficulty of applying the Daubert test, see generally Michael H. Graham,
The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining "Reliable" Under the Gatekeeping Test of
Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U.
Miami L. Rev. 317 (2000).
123. The Supreme Court declined to address this issue. See Weisgramn, 528 U.S. at 447
n. 3.
124. See id. at 444; Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 522-25 (Bright, J., dissenting).
125. See Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 517-22.
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Weisgram may be used to illustrate a second circumstance
in which the court of appeals should remand to the district court
rather than direct entry of judgment as a matter of law. Suppose
that the verdict winner in Weisgram had identified other
potential experts and asked the court of appeals for a new trial
on this ground. Under Daubert, whether to allow such testimony
lies within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on
appeal only for abuse of discretion.'26 In this circumstance, the
court of appeals should refuse to remand only if it finds that
allowing the new experts to testify would constitute an abuse of
the district court's discretion. In any other circumstance, the
court of appeals has usurped the power of the district court.'27
Finally, suppose that the plaintiff and verdict winner in
Weisgram tried to shore up his physical evidence in a petition
for rehearing after the appellate court's decision. Suppose that
the plaintiff had new evidence to present with respect to the
position of the throw rug that may have assisted in linking
excess heat created by the baseboard heater to the igniting of the
sofa, or evidence of the capacity of the flooring materials to heat
up and give off gases that could ignite. Would this evidence in
conjunction with the portions of the plaintiff's expert testimony
that the court of appeals permitted be sufficient to get the
plaintiff a new trial?
This type of decision is best reserved to the trial court. In
complicated factual situations such as Weisgram, the district
court is better positioned to evaluate whether a reasonable jury
could find for the plaintiff with the introduction of additional
evidence."' As the Neely Court noted: the verdict winner "may
have valid grounds for a new trial, some or all of which should
be passed upon by the district court, rather than the court of
126. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
127. Similarly, the court of appeals should remand where the verdict winner tendered
additional admissible evidence that was excluded as cumulative by the district court. Cf.
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1200 (3d Cir. 1993) (recognizing that, in
this circumstance, it would be unfair for a district court to grant judgment as a matter of
law for a verdict loser without considering all evidence admitted on behalf of the verdict
winner).
128. The reasonable juror standard determines whether a party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-56. Obviously, if no reasonable juror could find
for the plaintiff even with the introduction of the verdict winner's new evidence, there is no
reason to do anything other than enter judgment as a matter of law for the verdict loser.
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appeals, because of the trial judge's first-hand knowledge of
witnesses, testimony, and issues-because of his 'feel' for the
overall case." 129
It is true that the verdict winner in Weisgram never
presented any grounds for a new trial and never suggested to the
district court or the court of appeals any additional expert
testimony or physical evidence that he might introduce. 3
Perhaps the verdict winner had no such evidence. Perhaps this is
what the court of appeals meant when it noted that "this is not a
close case." ' If the plaintiff had no other evidence, there is no
difficulty in the court of appeals directing entry of judgment as a
matter of law for the verdict loser. However, it seems that the
verdict winner was entitled to a fair opportunity to develop
additional evidence in the district court, and the district court
was entitled, and in a better position to determine, whether any
such additional evidence warranted a new trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Neely and Weisgram hold that a federal appellate court
possesses the raw power to direct entry of judgment as a matter
of law pursuant to the Seventh Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 2106,
and Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These
holdings are correct and justified as a matter of policy because
in many cases the Court's procedure conserves judicial
resources. However, the Weisgram Court suggests that the
appellate power to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law
may be liberally exercised. Weisgram itself and some post-
Weisgram cases have followed this suggestion.'32
This latter development should give us pause. A federal
appellate court should direct entry of judgment as a matter of
law for a verdict loser without giving the verdict winner an
opportunity to present new trial grounds to the district court only
where: (a) the verdict winner's grounds for a new trial rest upon
129. Neely, 386 U.S. at 325.
130. See Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 456.
131. Weisgram, 169 F.3d at 517 n. 2.
132. See e.g. Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 2000); Wyvill '.
United Companies Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 306 (5th Cir. 2000); Concord Boat Corp. v.
Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1057 (8th Cir. 2000).
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legal questions the resolution of which makes it clear that no
new trial is warranted; (b) the verdict winner's grounds for a
new trial presented to the district court could not be sustained as
an exercise of discretion; and (c) the verdict winner presents no
grounds for a new trial and no reason why he should be
permitted to present such grounds to the district court in the first
instance. Conversely, a federal appellate court holding that a
district court erroneously denied a verdict loser's motion for
judgment as a matter of law should allow the district to resolve
any new trial motion by the verdict winner where: (a) it is unfair
to require the verdict winner to present his new trial grounds to
the court of appeals; (b) the new trial grounds involve an
exercise of the district court's discretion that would be entitled
to respect on appeal; and (c) the district court is in a superior
position to determine whether a new trial should be granted. On
the facts of Weisgram itself, it appears that the verdict winner
should have received the opportunity to present any new trial
grounds to the district court.
A return to Neely's healthy respect for the many
circumstances in which a verdict winner's new trial motion is
best decided by the district court would be welcome. Otherwise,
the Neely/Weisgram rule that federal appellate courts have the
power to direct entry of judgment as a matter of law may well
have more costs than benefits.

